



Mark Tushnet brings the art of metaphor to his analysis of separa-
tion of powers doctrines. His view, briefly stated, is that judges use what
he calls a "functional" analysis when they want to uphold a statute on
separation of powers grounds, and a "formalist" analysis when they want
to strike down a statute. According to Professor Tushnet, functionalists
analyze a statute's actual effects; they examine whether a statute employs
sensible methods, whether the statutory organization promotes the gen-
eral welfare, and whether the statutory scheme substantially alters the
balance of power among the branches. Formalists, on the other hand,
are more abstract. They first formulate a definition of a statute's tasks,
then ask whether those tasks fit into legislative, executive, or adjudica-
tory categories. Depending upon how the statute's tasks are character-
ized, formalists may then determine whether Congress has illegally
granted powers to one of the branches not authorized to so act.'
Before exploring how Professor Tushnet relates his thesis to the
Court's decision in Mistretta v. United States,2 one needs to understand
the changes wrought by the 1984 legislation3 under attack in that case as
unconstitutionally violating the separation of powers doctrine as well as
other constitutional provisions. As Professor Tushnet recognizes, that
* Robert C. and Nanette T. Packard Professor of Clinical Education, University of Southern
California Law Center. 1955, U.S. Naval Academy; LL.B. 1966, Yale Law School. My original
intention to call this Comment Metaphors Be with You was quickly squelched. Everyone who heard
the proposed title hated it. Perhaps only Prof. Avi Soifer of Boston University Law School would
have had the nerve to persevere in the face of such unanimous obloquy. See Confronting Deep
Strictures: Robinson, Rickey and Racism, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 passim (1985). I am grateful to
Judith Resnik for wise advice and to Peter Ferrera for untiring research assistance.
1. Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and Constitutional Theory: Bowls and Plateaus
in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L. Rv. 581, 584 (1992).
2. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
3. Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
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statute works two major departures from past federal sentencing prac-
tice, each of which increases the prosecutors' power and correspondingly
reduces the judges' power. First, the guideline system allows the prose-
cutors' charging decisions to control the sentence and leaves judges with
almost no power to intervene. Second, the sentencing system is now
almost entirely front-loaded, meaning that once a sentence is pro-
nounced, it cannot be changed unless a mistake has been made at the
time of sentencing in applying the guidelines,' a prosecutor asks for a
reduction in time as payment to a prisoner for cooperation,6 or the Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons requests a reduction because of a prisoner's severe
illness.7
The former statutory scheme distributed power to sentence not only
horizontally among the three branches, but also longitudinally among
several agencies within the executive branch. Congress defined crimes,
set punishment levels, and typically left sentencing judges with wide dis-
cretion to set minimum and maximum terms within the statutory limits.'
Police then, as now, had wide discretion about whom to arrest, how to
describe the conduct in question, and how much pressure to put on pros-
ecutors to charge particular crimes.9 Prosecutors had complete freedom
in deciding which crime to charge, but they had little control over what
sentences judges would impose after conviction. Most plea bargaining
with prosecutors involved dropping counts to limit sentencing expo-
sure.1 ° After conviction, the defendant would meet with a probation
4. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea For Less Aggrega-
tion, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 926 (1991).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988); Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112, 1117 (1992).
6. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.I
(1992) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]; Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1842 (1992).
7. Under the guidelines, the Bureau of Prisons uses 28 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (1988) to request a
reduction of sentence for a severely ill inmate.
8. Moreover, from time to time Congress specifies minimum sentences for various crimes.
This habit has increased over time and has persisted into the guideline era. For example, in 1970
there was no minimum sentence for a person with one prior conviction who was convicted for pos-
session of 100 or more grams of heroin with inteni to manufacture, distribute, or dispense. Con-
trolled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 401, 84 Stat. 1242, 1260-61 (1970). By 1988 the same
person, convicted for possession of between 100 and 999 grams of heroin, would receive a minimum
sentence of 10 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988). Similarly, in 1970 there was no minimum sentence for
a person with one prior conviction who was convicted of possession of 500 grams of PCP with intent
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense. § 401, 84 Stat. at 1260-61. In 1988, the minimum sentence
for a person with one prior conviction who was convicted for possession of between 10 and 99 grams
of pure PCP (or between 100 and 999 grams of a mixture) was 10 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988).
9. Mandatory minimum sentences are basically inconsistent with sentencing guidelines.
Alschuler, supra note 4, at 937.
10. A typical bargain would be a plea to one count, say mail fraud (maximum sentence of five
years under 18 U.S.C. § 1341), in return for dropping four or five other counts of mail fraud which,
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officer, whose report went to the judge. These presentence reports varied
widely in form and content, depending upon the probation officer's per-
sonality, experience, and training, and upon local practice. II The judge
would read the presentence report, hold a short hearing at which the
prosecutor, defense lawyer, and (sometimes) the defendant spoke,12 and
then impose a sentence somewhere within the limits set by Congress for
the particular crime of conviction.
Unlike the current system, in which sentencing is essentially a one-
shot deal, the sentencing process was composed of several steps and was
far from over after the judge had spoken. First, there was the possibility
of a reduction in sentence by the sentencing judge. Upon motion made
within 120 days after sentencing, or after an appeal or request for certio-
rari was denied, the sentencing judge could reduce the sentence. The
judge was not required to give reasons either for sentencing or for reduc-
tions in sentence.1
3
After sentencing, the defendant was remanded to the custody of the
Attorney General-custody regulated quite differently from now.
"Good time" reductions, granted under statutory authority, 4 could
reduce a sentence by nearly half. For example, a ten-year sentence meant
that a prisoner would actually serve about five years and eleven months,
assuming that the prisoner earned all of the good time possible. Because
the Bureau of Prisons exercised control over good time-withholding it
or taking it away for disciplinary violations, as well as granting extra
upon conviction, could result in a greatly increased sentence if the judge decided to impose consecu-
tive sentences for each count. Some bargains included a promise by a prosecutor to recommend a
certain sentence or to remain silent at sentencing. This capsule description does not capture the
infinite variety of tactics used by prosecutors and defense lawyers in dealing for time. Defense law-
yers strove to avoid prosecution altogether, to trade information for leniency, and to lock in sentenc-
ing bargains by binding the judge to the bargain, which was possible but not widely done under rule
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(1)(A), (C). For good descriptions of the plea bargaining process, see
KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 10, 14-16 (1985), and MILTON HEUMANN,
PLEA BARGAINING passim (1977).
11. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 26-38 (1973).
12. The defendant had (and still has) an absolute right of allocution. FED. R. CRiM. P. 32;
United States v. Laverne, 963 F.2d 235, 236 (9th Cir. 1992). Often defendants waive this right or say
only a few words.
13. Judges' failure to articulate reasons was, of course, one of the reasons that proponents of
the guidelines (who could point to many instances of wildly disproportionate sentences) gave when
arguing for sentencing reform. See PIERCE O'DONNELL, MICHAEL J. CHURGIN & DENNIS E. CUR-
TIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM 2-3 (1977); FRANKEL, supra note 11,
at 108-11.
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161-4162 (1948), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-
3586 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
1992]
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good time for superior work-the Bureau had significant power over the
actual length of a sentence.
Parole was yet another component of sentencing. The U.S. Parole
Commission had authority to release a prisoner (with specified limita-
tions or "conditions" on liberty) either immediately, in certain circum-
stances, 15 or, more commonly, after the prisoner had served a minimum
of one third of the sentence originally imposed.16 If a prisoner, once
released, violated the conditions of parole, he or she could be "violated"
and by the Parole Commission required to serve the remainder of the
term originally set by the judge.17 In the early 1970s, the Commission
began deliberately structuring its "decisionmaking" by using guidelines
to take into account and to counteract, when possible, the disparities
introduced into the system by judges. 8
Thus, in the former system, discretion was widely shared by the
three branches. Each branch had significant power to influence the terms
and conditions of a particular sentence, and both the judicial and the
executive branches had the power to act not just at the initial pronounce-
ment of sentence, but also over time. Judges had wide discretion, but
always within limits set in the beginning by law enforcement agents and
prosecutors, and at the end by the Parole Commission. 9 Congress set
15. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (1976) allowed the Parole Commission to release the prisoner on
parole "at such time as the Commission may determine." Repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II,
§ 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027 (1984).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1976) provided that when serving a term of more than one year, "a
prisoner shall be eligible for release on parole after serving one-third of such term or terms or after
serving ten years of a life sentence or of a sentence of over thirty years." Repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-
473, tit. II, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027 (1984).
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4213-4214 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 218(a)(5), 98
Stat. 2027 (1984).
18. William J. Genego, Peter D. Goldberger & Vicki C. Jackson, Parole Release Decisionmak-
ing and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 822-23 (1975). It is ironic that Congress over-
stated the inadequacies of the Parole Commission's procedures and philosophy when it abolished
parole and adopted the guideline system. In Mistretta, the Court cited a congressional report that
concluded that the parole system was unable to deal with judicial sentencing disparity and that
decried the uncertainty about the amount of time an offender would actually spend in prison. The
report also stated that the Commission's guidelines did not deal with the sophistication of the offense
nor the role that an offender played in a group offense. Both statements were in error. See id. at
823-24 (explaining that the Parole Board's guideline table scored inmates in part on "Offense Sever-
ity"). In fact, the then-Parole Commission's guidelines actually were the precursors of the sentenc-
ing guidelines, which are constructed according to the very same theories.
19. There is yet another sentencing process-the pardon power of the executive, which is used
either to pardon outright or to commute sentences. Potentially a valuable tool for reducing dispari-
ties and for controlling prison population, this power has been used so infrequently in recent years
that as a practical matter it is virtually a dead letter. Records from the Office of the Pardon Attor-
ney of the U.S. Department of Justice show only 32 commutations of sentences since fiscal year
1980. Pardons after completion of sentence are more common.
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upper and lower limits but left individual decisions to the other branches.
The executive could choose which crimes to charge, make recommenda-
tions about sentencing, exercise discretion in deciding when to release a
prisoner eligible for parole, and control the length of the sentence
through grant or denial of good-time credits.
Today's sentencing system is starkly different from the one in effect
five years ago.20 Parole has been abolished. Reduction of a sentence for
good time has been cut back sharply, to about fifteen percent of the sen-
tence.2 The shift to a guideline system has caused most of the discretion
formerly held by judges to flow to the executive. And within the execu-
tive branch, the front-loading of this increased discretion has left prose-
cutors and law enforcement agents as the main beneficiaries.22 Only
Congress retains roughly the same amount of power as before-that is
because Congress still defines what conduct is criminal and sets maxi-
mum and minimum punishments for crimes.23
Judges cannot easily make decisions outside the narrowly prescribed
guideline range.24 Even credit for cooperation with law enforcement offi-
cials is controlled by prosecutors.25 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
35, which formerly allowed judges to reduce sentences after imposition,
20. Although the legislation was passed in 1984, it did not become effective until November
1987. § 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. at 1987.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988).
22. Undercover law enforcement agents can enhance sentences under the guidelines by
manipulating such factors as the amount or type of drugs involved in the transaction, whether fire-
arms are involved in the offense, and whether the deal takes place near a school. Saul M. Pilchen,
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Undercover Sting Operations: A Defense Perspective, 4 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 115, 115 (1991).
23. Congress has shown a heavy hand in both areas. It has increased the use of minimum
sentences. See supra note 8. Congress has also expanded the types of conduct considered to be
criminal. For example, distributing narcotics in or near schools, 21 U.S.C. § 860 (1988), and to
pregnant women, 21 U.S.C. § 861 (1988), carry increased penalties.
24. Judges are especially limited in their ability to depart downward. The Guidelines Manual
allows departures downward in cases of substantial assistance to authorities (only upon motion of
the prosecutor), U.S.S.G., supra note 6, § 5Kl.1; mitigating circumstances not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission, § 5K2.0; victim's wrongful or contributing conduct,
§ 5K2.10; committing a lesser harm to avoid a greater harm, § 5K2.11; coercion and duress,
§ 5K2.12; diminished capacity, § 5K2.13; and voluntary disclosure of offense, § 5K2.16. Opportuni-
ties for judges to depart upward are more available: aggravating circumstances not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission, § 5K2.0; death, § 5K2.1; physical injury,
§ 5K2.2; extreme psychological injury, § 5K2.3; abduction or unlawful restraint, § 5K2.4; property
damage or loss, § 5K2.5; weapons and dangerous instrumentalities, § 5K2.6; disruption of govern-
ment function, § 5K2.7; extreme conduct, § 5K2.8; criminal purpose, § 5K2.9; endangering of pub-
lic welfare, § 5K2.14; and terrorism, § 5K2.15.
25. See supra note 6.
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has been abolished.26 One of the statutory innovations was to permit
prosecutors as well as defendants to appeal sentences,27 and appeals
indeed have been frequent.28 Grounds for appeal are narrow, however,
and usually focus only upon whether the judge has applied the guidelines
correctly.
29
In short, the 1984 legislation was a watershed in the world of sen-
tencing and profoundly changed both the allocation of sentencing powers
and the time frame in which sentencing occurs. How are such changes
measured in separation of powers theory? Professor Tushnet posits that
three metaphorical worldviews of the Constitution and of the political
system of the United States affect judicial understanding of separation of
powers problems. The first, the "delicate balance" or "mountain peak,"
sees our political system as poised at the top of a mountain, so that the
slightest push will send it to the bottom. This view could encourage a
formalism that would readily negate legislative decisions on separation of
powers grounds. If envisioning a delicate balance, judges need not know
much about the actual effects of a statutory scheme to invalidate it; all
judges need fear is change, which could and probably would lead to
disaster.30
The second metaphor Professor Tushnet deploys is the "bowl"-a
homeostatic system that returns to an equilibrium either at a former
point or (if the bowl has bumps on the bottom) a point nearby. Both
functionalists and formalists can be comfortable with this image. As
Professor Tushnet writes, "Whatever the approach, the underlying
thought would be that nothing much was likely to result from the inno-
vation. ' 31 The only danger is that a change will push the system over the
lip of the bowl, and such a drastic effect is perceived to be unlikely.
The third and most complicated metaphor is the "plateau with
depressions"; like the second metaphor, it is a "crude" rather than a
"delicate" balance. Under this vision, our system is always in a depres-
sion upon the plateau; changes shift us from one depression to another on
26. The new Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 allows a court to correct only a sentence
determined on appeal to have been imposed in violation of the law. On motion of the government,
the court may also reduce a sentence for the defendant's subsequent assistance in another investiga-
tion or prosecution. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
28. Appellate courts already have reviewed several thousand cases dealing with the guidelines.
See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1691-92 (1992).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
30. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 597.
31. Id. at 598.
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the plateau-which is no big deal unless we are near the edge of the
precipice itself. The problem is that from our current sunken position,
we cannot tell how close we are to the edge. Formalists conclude that we
might be near enough to the edge that rigid adherence to former alloca-
tion of power is necessary.32 Functionalists implicitly are more comfort-
able, either visualizing a plateau with a large area or trusting in their
analyses to let them know when the edge is near.
Professor Tushnet's insight, drawn from these metaphors, is that the
functionalist's analysis comes to resemble formalism for two reasons.
First, under either the homeostatic ("bowl") or the plateau view,33 func-
tionalists tend to believe that short-run shifts in the balance of power will
even out in the long run and return the system to its original position, or
somewhere near it. Second, judges, as generalists, are not capable of
acquiring and processing information that would allow them to predict
accurately the effects of legislation. Both of these reasons in turn suggest
that functionalists tend to ignore evidence of the actual effects of legisla-
tion-just as formalists do automatically when they concentrate only
upon rigid task classifications.34 However, despite his view that the two
modes of analysis collapse onto each other, Professor Tushnet ends up
opting for functionalism, on the quite reasonable ground that he refuses
to accept the formalists' invitation to "stop thinking after we have looked
at the statute and the Constitution."35 Professor Tushnet prefers to
employ a method of interpreting the Constitution that induces more
deliberation about the value of institutional innovations.
36
What does all this have to do with Mistretta? Professor Tushnet's
answer is that the Mistretta decision illustrates the Court's reliance on
32. Id. at 599. Prof. Tushnet is unclear about whether judges subscribe to these metaphoric
images before they decide cases or whether the decision precedes the metaphor. Nor is Prof.
Tushnet clear about the precise relationship between the metaphoric visions and the mode of analy-
sis adopted (formalistic or functionalistic), though it would be fair to infer that hard-wired formalists
(if there are such persons) subscribe to the mountain-peak metaphor. His statement that judges use
functional analysis when they want to uphold a statute and formalist analysis when they want to
strike down a statute suggests that the choice of method comes after a decision is made on other
grounds and also that the same judge (or panel of judges) might use either method depending on the
predetermined result. In other words, rather than judges being a priori either functionalists or for-
malists, judges may switch modes of decision making depending on what outcome they want to
reach.
33. Prof. Tushnet implicitly assumes that the bowl and plateau metaphors are the ones most
widely used by functionalists. This assumption seems to be right, but only if we make the further
assumption that judges embrace the metaphorical images before, not after, they reach decisions.
Otherwise, the metaphors are only makeweights and are not internalized by any judges.
34. Tushnet, supra note I, at 603.
35. Id. at 605.
36. Id.
1992]
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the "crude balance" (bowl and plateau) metaphors. First, given that the
legislation under consideration set up a structure that imposed significant
changes on the sentencing system, the Court saw any effect of the
makeup and location of the Sentencing Commission, which were the pri-
mary subjects of the Court's discussion, as likely to be minimal.17 Sec-
ond, the Court was probably relying upon homeostatic pressures that it
assumed would restore the former equilibrium, and did not believe that
the reallocation of power in the sentencing legislation would push the
system over the lip of the bowl or off the edge of the plateau.38
I wonder. Another explanation comes to mind. Perhaps the Mis-
tretta Court sought to stake a claim of significant if not primary judicial
involvement in the sentencing process, but as will be detailed below, it
had difficulty making that claim directly. According to Professor
Tushnet, "In Mistretta... the only real question for a functional analysis
of the separation of powers issues raised by the Sentencing Commission
is whether the courts can control prosecutors' exercises of discretion
affecting sentencing."3 9 The issue of unchecked executive branch power
is, indeed, a serious and fundamental question. I prefer to frame a
related but different question: Has the legislation impermissibly altered
the balance of power among all three branches by giving the executive
branch too much power and concentrating that power so as to front-load
and shorten the sentencing process?" Either of the two questions would
call for a searching investigation of the effects of the entire statute.
But the Court, at least on the surface, considered neither question.
In addressing issues involving separation of powers doctrine, the Court
did not consider the effects of the actual legislation, as set forth by Con-
gress and implemented by the Sentencing Commission, prosecutors, and
the courts. Rather, the Court considered only (a) the propriety of locat-
ing the Sentencing Commission in the judicial branch;41 (b) whether the
composition of the Commission impermissibly required judges to share
their power with nonjudges; 2 and (c) whether the presidential power to
appoint judges to the Sentencing Commission intruded too much upon
37. Id at 602.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 591.
40. Id at 583 n. 6. I prefer this formulation because it emphasizes that Congress, as well as the
judiciary, has a role in controlling the executive branch.
41. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384-97 (1989).
42. Id at 397-408.
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judicial independence.43 These concerns seem both formalistic and triv-
ial. Given the wholesale changes produced in the sentencing process by
the 1986 legislation, the composition and location of the Sentencing
Commission seem almost beside the point, in part because the statute,
coupled with mandatory minimum sentencing laws, effectively structures
the guidelines and limits the area in which the Sentencing Commission
has authority.' Given these legislative innovations, it is plain that the
statute itself, and not the composition or placement of the Sentencing
Commission, operates to alter significantly the balance of power in the
sentencing process, with the executive, namely police and prosecutors,
emerging as the big gainer and the judiciary as the big loser.
Given that the central "reforms" of the statute dwarf the role and
limit the powers of the Sentencing Commission, the mystery of Mistretta
is why the Court seemed to labor so greatly over its decision on the pow-
ers of the Sentencing Commission. My view is that the Court's struggle
arose not so much from the problems caused by the Sentencing Commis-
sion's location in the judicial branch or by judges' having to share power
with nonjudges, but from the realization that any claim of right by the
43. Id. at 408-11. These were the questions presented on appeal.
44. For example, the statute specifically instructs the Commission how to construct the guide-
lines. For guideline sentencing ranges, the Commission is told that the maximum of the range estab-
lished for the term of imprisonment shall not exceed the minimum of the range by more than 25% or
six months, whichever is greater (except if the minimum term is 30 years or more, in which case the
maximum may be life imprisonment). 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1988). The Commission, in establish-
ing guideline categories, is instructed to take into account the grade of the offense, the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances under which the offense was committed, the harm caused by the offense,
the community's and the public's view of the offense, the deterrent effect a sentence might have, and
the current incidence of the offense in the community and the nation. § 994(c). In establishing
categories of defendants for use in guidelines and policy statements governing probation, fines, super-
vised release, and imprisonment, the Commission is instructed that it may take into account the
defendant's age; education; vocational skills; mental, emotional, and physical condition; previous
employment record; family ties and responsibilities; community ties; role in the offense; criminal
history; and the degree of dependence upon criminal activity for livelihood, if these factors are deter-
mined to be relevant to the nature, extent, place of service, or other incidents of an appropriate
sentence. § 994(d). The Commission is also instructed, however, that the guidelines should not take
into account the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, or
community ties of the defendant in specifying a term or length of imprisonment. § 994(e). The
Commission is instructed to formulate the guidelines to minimize the likelihood that the prison
population will exceed capacity. § 994(g). In specifying terms of imprisonment for violent felonies
or certain drug offenses committed by defendants convicted twice before of similar crimes, the Com-
mission must specify a term at or near the maximum authorized. § 994(h). The Commission is also
instructed to specify substantial terms for other categories of defendants. § 994(i). Statutory
instructions stress the importance of leniency for first-time offenders and of imprisonment for crimes
involving serious bodily injury or death. § 994(j). The instructions reject rehabilitation as a reason
for imprisonment, call for incremental penalties for certain offenses, and specify when sentences can
be imposed consecutively. § 994(1). Guidelines are not to be bound by current sentences, § 994(m),
and a defendant may be rewarded for substantial assistance. § 994(n).
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judiciary to any role in sentencing is itself tenuous. If the Court had fully
addressed the statutory "reforms," it could not have avoided confronting
the question of what quantum of power judges must have in the sentenc-
ing process, and where that power comes from.
The answers to these questions would probably not be comforting to
advocates of judicial power. Professor Tushnet gives an example:
Suppose that instead of creating'the Sentencing Commission, Congress
had prescribed mandatory sentences for every offense, allowing for no
judicial deviation whatsoever, but had continued to allow parole at the
discretion of a parole board lodged in the executive branch. Although
Congress would thereby have shifted power from the judiciary to the
executive, it is hard to see how a serious constitutional challenge could
have been mounted. 45
Suppose further that Congress had simply mandated specific
sentences for each crime, with added penalties for recidivists and no dis-
cretion to deviate. Subtract the limited discretion now afforded sentenc-
ing judges, and such a scheme would be very similar to the one mandated
by the current statute. Could there be a successful constitutional chal-
lenge? Implicitly in Professor Tushnet's view, probably not.
We think of judges as very powerful actors in the sentencing pro-
cess, and for many years they have been. But it has not always been so.4 6
Moreover, many states in recent years have adopted sentencing guide-
lines that operate to reduce judicial input, sometimes drastically, into the
sentencing process. These developments suggest that neither common
law nor constitutional doctrine apportions sentencing authority specifi-
cally to judges. Further, recent scholarship has cast doubt on whether
any particular role remains reserved for judges in the sentencing pro-
cess.47 The uneasiness manifest in the Mistretta opinion stems from the
realization-deliberately unstated--that judges could be completely
removed from the process without raising separation of powers
problems.4" I believe this is the reason the Court went to such lengths to
45. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 589-90 (footnote omitted).
46. United States V. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978) ("In the early days of the Republic...
the period of incarceration was generally prescribed with specificity by the legislature."); United
States v. Hudson & Goodwin, II U.S. (I Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (stating that judges had no power to
punish anyone until the legislature "first made an act a crime" and "aflix[ed] a punishment to it").
47. Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L.
REv. 1253, 1313-15 (1988) ("Sentencing cannot be considered inherently judicial."); Lewis J. Liman,
The Constitutional Infirmities of the United States Sentencing Commission, 96 YALE L.J. 1363, 1387
(1987) ("The specification of sentencing ranges has never been considered an inherent judicial func-
tion like the promulgation of court rules.").
48. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 590.
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emphasize the historic role of judges and to extol their expertise, while
grudgingly accepting the congressional scheme.
As Justice Blackmun wrote for all but Justice Scalia:
For more than a century, federal judges have enjoyed wide discretion
to determine the appropriate sentence in individual cases and have
exercised special authority to determine the sentencing factors to be
applied in any given case. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act
makes clear that Congress' decision to place the Commission within
the Judicial Branch reflected Congress' "strong feeling" that sentenc-
ing has been and should remain "primarily a judicial function"....
That Congress should vest such rulemaking in the Judicial Branch, far
from being "incongruous" or vesting within the Judiciary responsibili-
ties that more appropriately belong to another Branch, simply
acknowledges the role that the Judiciary always has played, and con-
tinues to play, in sentencing.49
The footnote that appeared at the end of the last sentence is telling and
bears repeating: "Indeed, had Congress decided to confer responsibility
for promulgating sentencing guidelines on the Executive Branch, we
might face the constitutional question whether Congress unconstitution-
ally had assigned judicial responsibilities to the Executive or unconstitu-
tionally had united the power to prosecute and the power to sentence
within one Branch."50 The opinion went on to extol the qualifications of
judges in sentencing:
As already noted, sentencing is a field in which the Judicial Branch
long has exercised substantive or political judgment .... Congress
placed the Commission in the Judicial Branch precisely because of the
Judiciary's special knowledge and expertise.... [S]ubstantive judg-
ment in the field of sentencing has been and remains appropriate in the
Judicial Branch, and the methodology of rulemaking has been and
remains appropriate to that Branch.51
Mistretta, then, can be taken as primarily a political statement to
serve notice on Congress that the Court was concerned about the distri-
bution of power within the sentencing process, even though the Court
was unwilling or unable at that time to claim a particular role for judges.
As consolation, the Court might also, in Professor Tushnet's terms, have
believed that the plateau-with-depressions metaphor describes the overall
situation, and that the normal give-and-take of the actors in the system
will cause the system to return sometime in the future to a position where
49. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390-91 (1988).
50. Id. at 390.
51. Id. at 396-97.
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discretion will be more evenly distributed, with the prosecutorial power
less dominant and judges regaining significant authority.
I believe we are closer to the edge than the Mistretta opinion
acknowledges. The edge here represents not only the erosion of separa-
tion of powers; over the edge lie significant losses of liberty. My principal
objections to the guidelines are twofold: that no adequate mechanisms
exist by which to correct sentencing mistakes, either individual or aggre-
gate,52 and that the redistribution of power has increased the likelihood
of unduly prolonged incarceration. Unduly long sentences are horrible
for those who must serve them; moreover, the longer sentences imposed
on an ever-increasing prison population will create a significant class of
prison-adapted, infantilized, asocial individuals who will cause consider-
able trouble when they are at last released. 3
The imbalance of power in the system, exemplified by the domi-
nance of prosecutors in setting prison terms, at once causes and exacer-
bates these problems. The primary job of prosecutors is to charge,
convict, and (now) select a sentence. Prosecutors, as a rule and by virtue
of their primary-role definition, are less involved in issues of overall sys-
tem fairness than are parole board members, who for example see a
broad aggregate picture of all convicted felons, or judges, who hear com-
plaints about unfair treatment from defendants as they move through all
parts of the system-pretrial to prison and beyond. It is the differences
in role that make me, in Professor Tushnet's terms, a functionalist and
that prompt me to want to respond to the question the Court left unad-
dressed: why judges should have a greater role in sentencing than is cur-
rently allocated.
First, unlike prosecutors (who, in essence, hold the power to sen-
tence), judges are supposed to be impartial. Despite the cynical view
52. The Commission's retroactivity policy, U.S.S.G., supra note 6, § 1B1.10, may allow a
reduction in an inmate's term under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (1988) if, while he or she is imprisoned,
the guideline range applicable to his or her offense is lowered by amendment. Reductions may be
considered only if certain guidelines have been amended. U.S.S.G., supra note 6, § 1Bl.10(d). In
determining whether a reduction is warranted, the court must consider the sentence as it would have
been imposed under the amended guidelines. Id. § 11l.10(b). Reductions may not exceed the
number of months by which the maximum of the guideline range applicable to the defendant has
been lowered. Id. § 1BI.10(c).
53. Under the guidelines, the length of prison sentences has increased in many sentence catego-
ries. Sentences for robbery are 85% longer under the new law, with the average time served now
83.1 months, as opposed to 44.8 months under the old law. Drug offenders now average 64.3-month
sentences, compared with only 23.1 months before the guidelines went into effect. That is an
increase of 178%. J. Michael Quinlan, Intermediate Punishments as Sentencing Options, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 217, 219 (1992). These increases have exacerbated prison overpopulation. The current
federal prison population is more than 66,000 inmates, or 148% of capacity. Id. at 218 & n.2.
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(and the surface appearance in many cases) that judges favor the prose-
cution, judges are at the very least likely to be more evenhanded than
prosecutors, and thus they tend to make fairer sentencing decisions.5 4
Second, judges tend to be older and have more life experience than prose-
cutors, especially in the federal system, where prosecutors tend to spend
only their early practice years before entering private practice. This age
and experience differential does not, of course, guarantee fairer
sentences-but experience should at least in many cases contribute to a
balanced viewpoint. Third, and importantly, judges actually come into
contact with the individuals to be sentenced and have the opportunity to
evaluate them in a more immediate way than does a Sentencing Commis-
sion, which must perforce deal with aggregates, or prosecutors, who by
definition focus on defendants as culprits. Of course, it was the way that
judges dealt with individual cases in the past that led to the adoption of
the guidelines. Judges operated within large sentencing spreads" and
did not have to give reasons for their sentences, and very limited avenues
for appeal of sentences existed.56 Horror stories abounded.5 But the
guidelines system now in effect goes too far in the opposite direction.
Judges are extremely limited in deviating from prescribed guideline
ranges-ranges that capture a wide variety of different types of people
within their borders.58 Without the opportunity for departure, and with
almost unbridled prosecutorial discretion, horror stories again abound.59
54. This point could be used by those challenging the statutory scheme on due process
grounds.
55. For example, former 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) provided that persons convicted of bank robbery
could be fined not more than $5000, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. Before the sen-
tencing guidelines, a judge could thus sentence a person convicted under this statute to probation, 20
years, or anything in between.
56. A sentence imposed within statutory limits was generally not subject to review, with nar-
row exceptions. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (sentence based on misinforma-
tion about a defendant's prior criminal record was subject to review); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736, 741 (1948) (defendant denied due process of law by sentence based on misinformation about
prior criminal record).
57. See O'DONNELL, CHURGIN & CURTis, supra note 13, at 1-14 (demonstrating the sentenc-
ing disparity of the period through statistical analysis).
58. For example, the Commission was instructed by Congress to ensure that the guidelines
reflect the "general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment
record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties" of a defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e)
(1988).
59. Alschuler, supra note 4, at 921-22 (describing a drug runner guilty of selling two vials of
crack being sentenced to at least 63 months because the court, in calculating the total quantity of
crack sold, added the weight of his supplier's 586 vials as part of the same course of conduct); Jose
A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines A Dismal Failure, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at 2 (citing Chap-
man v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 334 (1992) (upholding guideline measurement that allows sentences
for selling LSD to vary greatly depending not on the drug quantity but on the weight of the carrier's
medium of choice, for example, blotter paper (light) or sugar cubes (heavier))).
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Some middle ground must be found. We need a common law of
sentencing, based on a guideline system that is not rigid and inflexible.
Judges should be required to give reasons for their sentences, but they
should also be allowed to depart from guideline ranges based on their
evaluation of individual defendants. Appeals must be afforded, and ways
should exist to correct sentences even long after appeal if we become
convinced that particular sentences, or aggregates of sentences, are too
harsh or are otherwise unfair. That common law could be developed
from a constitutional theory that argues, either as a matter of separation
of powers or due process, for a role for the judiciary in sentencing. As
the Mistretta Court took pains to indicate, such an argument could flow
from the obvious inequity of combining the prosecution and sentencing
functions in one branch, the executive.
And so back to Professor Tushnet's two modes of decision, func-
tionalism and formalism, and three metaphors, mountain peak, bowl,
and plateau-all offered to explain how courts decide separation of pow-
ers issues. I believe that Professor Tushnet's theory that functionalism
and formalism are closely related is borne out by the failure of the Court
to consider fully the effects of the whole statute (functionalist judges can-
not assimilate complex data very well, so they tend to ignore them, just
as formalists do automatically). In addition, the Court used both func-
tionalist and formalist analyses in the same opinion. If we agree that the
decision about the location and composition of the Sentencing Commis-
sion is functionalist, why the emphasis and insistence in the opinion upon
the historical powers and expertise of judges in the sentencing process?
Surely the claims of a role for judges, without analysis of how the statute
affects that role, have a formalist cast. The Court was sending a (formal)
message to Congress, hoping to preserve a substantial role for judges in
sentencing. The message was, "Don't go any farther down this road.
Judges are important and necessary participants in the sentencing pro-
cess, and even now too much power may be in the hands of the execu-
tive." I hope that this message is heeded. Introduction of properly
limited judicial discretion in sentencing is, in my view, the best way to
restore the "homeostatic balance" among the branches so that we can
approach, if not reach, a just and impartial sentencing system.
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